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ABSTRACT 
Ths  paper investigates the properties of equilibrium in insurance 
markets where insurers can obtain specific and private knowledge of the 
loss experience of their customers. We examine the case where firms 
obtain information over time from insurance claims and use these data in 
a Bayesian fashon to adjust individual premiums t;o experience. 
We first consider the case where firms can change their premiums 
from one period to the next and customers are free to stay or leave as 
they see fit. We refer to this case as a s ing le  period equi l ibr ium.  The 
resulting premium schedule earns monopoly profits even if entry by new 
firms into the insurance market is perfectly free. We next investigate a 
m y o p i c  m u l t i -  period equi l ibr ium,  in which firms maximize the present 
value of the stream of expected profits over the period in which the indi- 
vidual is insured, but individuals select the firm offering the lowest premi- 
ums. With free entry, expected profits are zero but premiums are gen- 
erally too low or too high relative to actuarial values. We also investigate 
the properties of a full  m u l t i -  period equiLibri,um where insurance firms 
specify premiums in advance for all future periods as a function of the 
number of claims that a customer has made within a given time span. In 
this type of equilibrium long-run profits are zero and insurance firms 
consciously charge actuarially unfair premiums to some of their custo- 
mers. 
Although these models are illustrated in an insurance context, they 
also apply to other situations as well, notably labor markets. The con- 
cluding sections briefly explores these extensions and draws out lessons 
for regulatory policy. 
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J3QUILIBRlUM IN INSURANP MARKETS 
WITH EXPEFUEXCE RATING 
Howard Kunreuther and Mark Pauly 
Asymmetry of information between parties to a market transaction 
has been extensively discussed by economists in recent years. This paper 
investigates the functioning of insurance markets in which insurers can 
obtain specific and private knowledge of the characteristics of their cus- 
tomers. In particular, we focus on the case where the insurer obtains 
"inside information" by observing the loss experience of its customers 
and utilizes these data to charge differential premiums. This type of 
"experience rating" of individuals or groups is commonly used by firms in 
setting rates for automobile, health, llfe and unemployment insurance. 
'The remearch reported in this paper ie partially supported by the Bundesministerium fuer 
Forschung und Technologie, F.R.G., contract no. 321/7591/RG8 8001. While support for this 
work is gratefully acknowledged, the views expressed are the authors' and n0.t necessarily 
ahared by the sponsor. We are grateful to Zenan Fortune and Serge Medow for computational 
assistance and to  David Cumrnins and the participants in the Conference on Regulation of the 
International Institute of Management, Berlin, July, 1881, especially Jorg Finsinger and Paul 
Kleindorfer for helpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper is includ- 
ed in the conference proceedings. 
Our approach is motivated by recent literature on adverse selection 
in insurance and other markets. This problem was placed in the broad 
perspective of differential information by Akerlof's (1970) discussion of 
"lemons." Arrow (1963) previously showed in the context of health 
insurance and medical care, that there can be a market failure due to 
adverse selection if consumers have perfect information on their risk but 
the insurer is ignorant. 
Two characteristics of the information the insurer collects from 
observing h s  policyholders' experiences are crucial: 
(1) In general, the information will be incomplete a t  any point in 
time, in the sense that an individual's past experience with that  
insurance firm will not provide a completely accurate indicator 
of the person's risk probability 
(2) The insurer will not be willing to communicate t h s  hs to ry  to 
other insurers, and the individual will not be able to communi- 
cate it in a fully verifiable way. If  the only agent who can verify 
an  individual's hs to ry  is his current insurance firm, t h s  hs to ry  
will be private knowledge for that firm. Other firms may be able 
to  obtain external verification of an  individual's record but only 
a t  some cost. 2 
Although we illustrate our models in an insurance context, they also 
apply to other situations as well, notably labor markets. In particular, 
the results of our analysis may provide the basis for a model of internal 
labor markets which is in the spirit of the work by Williamson, Wachter, 
and Harris (1975). For example, employers may not be able to character- 
ize their employees by productivity class when they join the firm initially 
but they are  able to "experience rate" workers by observing their 
behavior on the job. This informaLion will be private so that employees 
may have difficulty signaling their skills to  other firms. 
 avid Cumrnins has pointed out to us that automobile insurance firms are able to obtain :in- 
formation on driving records from state motor vehicle departments. These driving records, 
however, may be an imperfect substitute for claim records maintained by insurance com- 
panies, since accidents and traffic tickets are not perfectly correlated. 
Whle the general case of labor markets with imperfect information 
about productivity has been extensively investigateda3 there has not 
been, to our knowledge, an explicit consideration of the existence of or 
the properties of equilibrium when informational asymmetry can be 
induced by the passage of time. We will suggest that the character of 
equilibrium helps explain the persistence of long-term relationships 
between worker and employer, or between customer and firm for goods 
where quality is known only by experience. 
The following problem is analyzed in detail. Suppose that a set  of 
customers has been with a specific insurance firm for t years during 
which time the firm has collected information on their claims experience. 
The insurer naturally does not make t h s  data available to other firms, 
and consumers are unable to furnish verified hstories. Not having direct 
knowledge of each customer's risk class, the insurance firm utilizes 
claims data to  set premiums. What schedule of rates should be set so 
that no customer will have an incentive to purchase insurance elsewhere 
in period t + l? 
We consider two polar cases with regard to the assumption made 
about firm behavior. A t  one extreme, we assume that the firm has n o  
foresight, so that i t  must be able to set a price to make non-negative 
expected profits in every period. At the other extreme, we assume that 
the firm has perj'ect foresight, in the sense that it maximizes the present 
discounted value of the expected profit stream over a planning horizon, 
regardless of the level of profits in any one period. We also consider two 
polar assumptions about consumer foresight: either consumers choose 
the firm making the most attractive offer in the current period, or they 
have the foresight to consider the stream of premiums that will be 
charged in the current period and in all future periods based on their loss 
experience. 
'see in particular the papers by Burdett and Mortensen (1080), Riley (1979), and Hashimoto 
and Yu (1960). 
We refer to the situation in whch neither firm nor customer has 
foresght as a s ing l e -  pe r iod  e q u i l i b r i u m  since firms can change their 
price from one period to the next and customers are free to stay or leave 
as they see fit. We refer to the situation in whch firms maximize 
discounted expected profits but consumers choose only on the basis of 
current period premiums as m y o p i c  m u l t i -  pe r iod  e q u i l i b r i u m .  Finally, 
we refer to the situation in whch both consumers and firms have 
foresight as fu l l  m u l t i -  pe r iod  e q u i l i b r i u m .  4 
The paper is organized as follows. We first begin at  the end, so to 
speak, by considering in Section I1 a static model in which the firm 
currently selling insurance to an individual is fully informed about his 
risk class. Section I11 develops a model in whch firms obtain such infor- 
mation over time from the claims experience of the insured and use t h s  
information in a Bayesian fashon to adjust individual premiums to experi- 
ence. We show that in the single-period equilibrium model, the resulting 
premium schedule yields positive expective profits and monopoly distor- 
tions even if entry by new firms into the market is completely free. Profit 
or rate regulation would be a natural remedy if reality approximated this 
equilibrium. We further consider briefly the impact on the single period 
equilibrium of permitting customers to buy verified information on their 
experience. Th.is would include purchase of data on premium classifica- 
tions or claim records. 
Section N is devoted to multi-period models. We show that in the 
myopic multi-period equilibrium, expected profits are zero with free 
entry, but price distortions remain. Premiums are generally below 
expected costs in the early periods, but eventually rise to  exceed 
expected costs. In full multi-period equilibrium firms will offer consu- 
mers multi-period policies which specify in advance the way premiums 
will vary with a customer's experience. Firms must then abide by this 
schedule, but customers can seek insurance elsewhere a t  any time. (This 
40ne of the purposes of experience rating is to cope with problems of moral hazard. [t does 
this by rewarding those who do not make claims on their policy in period t with lower premi- 
ums in the next period. This paper does not answer the question analytically as to whether 
these type of premium adjustment processes eliminates or substantially reduces morul ha- 
zard. 
model is like explict contracting in labor market theory.) We show that, 
in equilibrium, expected profits will be zero but firms will consciously 
charge some customers actuarially unfair premiums.. We conjecture that 
this equilibrium is Pareto optimal so that regulation, far from being help- 
ful, may actually inhibit the attainment of optimality if it requires premi- 
ums to be equal or proportional to the actuarially fair premiums for indi- 
viduals classified by loss frequency. The concluding section draws out les- 
sons for regulation policy and suggests possible applications and exten- 
sions of the analysis. 
The existence and character of equilibrium in insurance markets 
with adverse selection has been dealt with by Rothschild and Stglitz 
(hereafter referred to as R-S) (1976) and Pauly (1974). R-S suggest that 
firms will market insurance contracts which specify price and the total 
amount of insurance purchased to potential customers. The total quan- 
tity of coverage acts as a signal to differentiate the b g h  and low risks. 
Pauly, in contrast, suggests that insurers cannot be expected to obtain 
accurate information on the total purchases of any individual, since it will 
be in the interest of the individual and a supplemental insurer to conceal 
the fact of purchase. Extensions of the R-S approach, using different con- 
cepts of static equilibrium, have been provided by Wilson (1977), Miyasaki 
(1977), Jaynes (1978), Spence (1978), and Grossman (1979). Pauly's 
approach has been analyzed by Johnson (1978). 
In t b s  paper we make Pauly's assumption that firms do not know the 
total amount of insurance an individual has purchased. We do so for 
three reasons: 
1. The empirical support for the assumption that all firms do 
exchange information about total purchases of insurance is 
weak. While some firms exchange such information, the fre- 
quency of complaints about the failure of such "coordination of 
benefits" schemes is legion (Follman 1963). 
2. If insurers do not have accurate information on total purchases 
then there is an incentive for individuals to purchase policies 
from several firms and conceal their portfolio. This type of 
behavior prevents any firm from marketing a se t  of "price- 
quantity" policies since potential customers will always pur- 
chase the portfolio of policies with the lowest cost per dollar 
coverage. 
3. Suppose one accepts the R-S assumptions that firms can  moni- 
tor total purchases and that insurance demand varies with risk 
class. Then the quantity of insurance bought by any customer is 
a perfect and instantaneous signal of the individual's risk 
category.5 Consequently, adverse selection ceases to be a prob- 
lem. 
Our world consists of two types of consumers. Every consumer faces 
a possibility of an  identical single loss (X) w h c h  is correctly estimated 
and which is independently distributed across individuals. Each consu- 
mer  type i has a different probability of a loss, Gi C = H ,  L for the high and 
low risk group respectively (GH>iPL).  The consumers correctly perceive 
these values of G i .  The proportion of h g h  and low risk consumers in the 
population is given by Nl, and NL respectively. Type i's preference is 
represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstein utility function, U i ,  and each 
consumer determines the optimal amount of insurance to purchase by 
maximizing expected utility E(  U i ) .  
The insurance industry consists of n firms, all of whom estimate X 
correctly. We initially assume that  each consumer has been insured by 
the same firm for a sufficiently long period of time that the insurer has 
collected enough information through claim. payments and other data to  
sindeed, the signal is so eood that, if all individuals have t h e  same utility function, the mere 
decision to purchase a particular quantity of insurance signals the individual's risk class; a 
person who has signaled that he is low risk by choosing the small quantity policy could then 
be offered full coverage a t  a ra te  near the actuarial level for good risks. Hence, even when 
an  R-S equilibrium occurs, it may b e  dominated by such a strategy. Of course, this new stra- 
tegy may itself be dominated as consumers learn t o  respond by offering false synals about 
their initial most preferred policy. 
specify iP, exactly for each individual. The remaining n - 1  firms in the 
industry cannot determine whether individuals insured by others are h g h  
or low risk people; an insured's past hstory is not and cannot be common 
knowledge. Each insurer offers a premium, Pi ,  the same for all individu- 
als in risk group a ,  without specifying the amount of coverage, Q,:, which 
has to be purchased, except that 0 S Q,: < X. If firms have information on 
the risk class of their clients they can charge differential premiums to 
high and low risk individuals; other firms in the industry are forced to 
charge the same premium to both groups because they cannot distin- 
guish high risks from low risks. However, each firm does know how many 
periods the individual has been in the market, including whether he is a 
new customer. 
We now characterize the strategies available to insurers and consider 
the possibility of equilibrium. With regard to a particular client, it is use- 
ful to t h n k  of firms as either being "informed," i.e, having sold a policy to 
an individual in the previous period, or "uninformed," i.e., treating the 
client as a customer new to that firm? Consider first the situation of a 
representative uninformed firm. It knows that each consumer has the 
insurance demand curve: 
which is derived from constrained utility maximization. Since the unin- 
formed firm cannot distinguish between risks, it will have to  set  
PH = PL = P .  In a free-entry world with firms that  maximize expected 
profit E(lr), the breakeven premium P* for such firms would be given by 
the lowest value of P such that: 
where QL is the total amount purchased by L's and QH is the total 
amount; purchased by ITS a t  the uniform premium P*.  Figure 1 
illustrates the case of an equilibrium when both groups purchase 
insurance. The low risk group subsidizes the high risk group and pur- 
chases partial coverage QL < X, while high risk individuals purchase full 
coverage, QH = X, a t  subsidized rates. 6 
Figure 1: 
The informed insurer can use his exact knowledge of each present 
customer's ai ,  i = H , L ,  to set  rates tailored to each customer's experi- 
ence. For h g h  risk individuals, the informed firm will reduce its 
expected profits if i t  charges less th.an a H .  For low risk individuals, the 
rate i t  will charge will depend on the premium charged by uninformed 
firms. The informed firm maximizes expected profits by charging low 
risk individuals a little less than the price offered by the uninformed firm 
%en the  only value of P which satisfies (L) is P* = Q H ,  then QL = 0, and the nlarket 
will only provide coverage to  high risk in&viduals. l'his is  a case of market failure, since low 
risk individuals cannot purchase hqurance due t o  imperfect information by firms. 
to all purchasers of insurance. (The uninformed firm's price must be 
larger than P C  for it to earn profits.) The informed firm then attracts all 
low risks, and makes profits of (P! - QL) NL, whlch rises as P; rises. If 
uninformed firms are charging P C  + 6, for example, the informed firm 
will want to charge its low risk customers the lower of one of two rates. It 
will either charge P C  or it will charge pL, the premium whch would max- 
imize profits on low-risk insureds if the hrm were a monopolist. A t  the 
other extreme, if uninformed firms are charging Q H  to everyone, then the 
informed firm will charge either i P H  - E or pL, whchever is less. 
But just as the informed firm's optimal pricing strategy depends on 
the strategies selected by uninformed firms, so does an uninformed 
firm's strategy (and profits) depend on what the informed firm is doing. 
The strategic combinations and resulting outcomes are shown as the pay- 
off matrix in Flgure 2, with the upper expression in each cell (labeled 1-4) 
representing the payoff (profits) to the informed firm (I) ,  and the lower 
expression the payoff to the uninformed iirrn ( U ) .  When one type of firm 
obtains no business, and all customers purchase from the other type of 
firm, a profit level of zero is entered. 
But just as the informed firm's optimal pricing strategy depends on 
the strategies selected by uninformed firms, so does an uninformed 
firm's strategy depend on what the informed firm is doing. The strategic 
combinations and payoffs are shown as the payoff matrix, in Figure 2, 
with the upper expression in each labeled cell 1...4 being the payoff (pro- 
fits) to the informed firm (I) ,  and the lower expression the payoffs to the 
uninformed firm ( U ) .  When one type of firm obtains no business, and all 
customers purchase from the other type of firm, a profit level of zero is 
entered. Here we are assuming that both P C  and G H  are less than pL. 7 
I 
'11 pL is less thnn P *, then the informed firm will always charge pH = P H  and P! = pL 
making positive profits. Uninformed firms will not obtain m y  business no matter what they 
do. 
Figure 2. Payoff Matrix for Informed and Uninformed Firms. 
Stability of Equilibrium 
P" = aH 
Uninformed 
Firm 
'\ 
Informe d \ 
We will now show that there is no stable Nash equilibrium where there 
P" = P* + 6 < G H  
are both informed and uninformed firms. The argument is simple. If U 
Fir rn \ 
(uninformed) firms chose G H  - E ,  then I (informed) should choose G H  - E 
I 
to maximize profits. But if I chooses G H  - E ,  there exists some 
P* + 6 < GH - E at which U can make positive profits, while I gets no 
business and makes zero profit. But if U plays P* + 6, I should charge a 
little less (e.g., P * ) .  Then / makes positive profits, but U suffers a loss. 
To prevent this loss, U must charge a t  least G H .  But then I should 
charge GH - E ,  etc. If there are many players, the absence of a Nash 
equilibrium makes stability unlikely. 8 
' ~ o t e  that, from the vlew point of a single uninformed firm, the maldmum value that d can 
take in cell 3 in Figure 2, depends on what the firm assumes that the uninformed firms will 
do. Lf they continue playing strategy, G H ,  then the single uninformed firm can charge any- 
thing less than G H  - & and capture all the  business with a large profit. If each uninformed 
firm assumes the other uninformed firms will match its prices, then profits will be lower. 
What other concepts of equilibrium might apply here? If both parties 
followed maximin strategies, the outcome would be in cell 2, with the 
etrategy pairs ~ P L  = P* , PA = Q H j  for the informed firm, and p" = Q H j  
for the uninformed firm. In t h s  cell, the uninformed firm is sure that it 
will not lose money (although it will not make profits either). The 
informed firm guarantees itself positive profits. Thus, in a single-play 
context, or with a small number of players, we might expect the outcome 
to be in cell 2. 
Another possibility, already used in the literature on insurance 
markets and imperfect labor markets, is the concept of Wilson Equili- 
brium.' A given set of actions is a Wilson equilibrium if no firm can alter 
its behavior (i.e., propose a different premium) that will (a) earn larger 
positive profits immediately, and (b) continue to be more profitable after 
other firms have dropped all policies rendered unprofitable by the initial 
firm's new behavior. Is the pair (pi = PC, PA = QHj and (P" = QH + E ]  a 
Wilson equilibrium? The alternative strategy for the informed firm is to 
set ~ P L  = PA = aHj. This earns it larger profits and does n o t  cause the 
uninformed firms to  lose money if they maintain their same policy as 
before. However, an informed firm's charging I P ~  = P& = aH { would per- 
mit uninformed firms to  make positive profits by switching to 
P" = P* + E ;  this change reduces the informed firm's profit to zero. 
Thus, if we substitute the notion "rendered less profitable" for "rendered 
unprofitable" in part (b) of the above definition, then cell 2 does qualify as 
a Wilson equilibrium. 
An alternative equilibrium concept which leads to the same conclu- 
sion is based on a Stackelberg leader-follower model. It seems reasonable 
to suppose that the (single) informed firm will play the leadershp role. 
The reaction function for the uninformed firm is P' = f (PL), and the 
informed firm therefore maximizes its expected profit (TI1): 
'it was proposed by Wilson (1877) end has been utilized by, among others, Miyasaki (IQV), 
and Spence (1978), to characterize equilibrium. 
If the informed firm sets PL = P*, then P" = f (pi) = a H ,  and 
rI1 = NL QL (P* - a L )  > 0. If the informed firm sets PL = Q I H  - E ,  then 
P' = f (PL) = P* + 6 ,  and rI1 is zero. Hence, maximization of (3) 
requires pi to be P*. and the Stackelberg equilibrium is given by cell 2. 
To summarize, there are two conclusions based on the above discus- 
sion: 10 
(1) No single-period equilibrium exists, or 
(2) A single-period equilibrium is represented by 
~ P L  = P*, PA = a H {  for informed firms, IP' = Q H  + E {  for unin- 
formed firms, with all business going to informed firms. 
In what follows, we adopt the second conclusion by assuming that the 
informed and uninformed firms behave in a Stackelberg fashion, with the 
informed firm as the leader and the uninformed firms as the followers. 
This equilibrium is also achieved if one assumes that either firm follows a 
policy that maximizes the minimum profit they could attain no matter 
what uninformed firms did, or that  the modified definition of a Wilson 
equihbrium is appropriate. 
An Illustrative Example 
A simple example, to be used further in the rest of the paper, illus- 
trates how one determines a single period equilibrium for the above prob- 
lem.'' Risk averse consumers of each type i with wealth. 4, want to 
choose a value of Qi given Qi and Pi which maximizes E [Ui (Q~)]. For this 
two state problem the formulation is: 
subject to 
'%e have not considered the possibility of mixed strategies. 
'A more detailed discussion of this model appears in Kunreuther (1976). 
Let Ri be the contingency price ratio 
and define Rim= and R~~~ as the values of Ri where Qi = 0 and Qi = X 
respectively when one maximizes E [Ui  ( Q ~ ) ]  without any constraint on Q i .  
Then if 
, d Ui ui = - t d 2  ui > 0 and Ui = - < 0 
d Qi d Q: 
the optimal solution to (4) is given by: 
Whenever Pi S ai, then Qi = X, since in thls range the premium is 
either actuarially fair or subsidized. Suppose both consumer types have 
identical utility functions given by the exponential 
U H ( Y )  = U L ( Y )  = -e-", where c is the risk aversion coefficient. Then Qi 
is determined by 
Flgure 3 depicts the profit maximizing set of premiums for the 
specific case where aH = .30, iPL  = .lo, X = 40, c = .04, and NL = NH = .5. 
Uninformed firms would be forced to charge both b h  and low risk custo- 
mers P* = .254. The informed firms maximize their expected profits by 
Figure 3. Optimal Premium Structure With Perfect Information on Risk Classes. 
charging high risk customers P; = aH = .30. The profit-maximizing 
premium charged to  low risk customers is P; = ,217. This yields 
expected profits for the low risk group of 2, the cross-hatched area in Fig- 
ure 3, i .e . ,  [(.217-.100)(17.15)]. Aggregate expected profits are only 1 
since only half of the individuals are in the low risk class. 
In the no-mformation case, the equilibrium premium is P* for both 
high and low risks. When perfect information is available, and P i  = P * ,  all 
of the gains from information go to informed insurance firms in the form 
of higher profits. If P i  = pL, the low risk individual benefits by the 
amount that the resulting premium is below P*.  The higher risk consu- 
mers are  made unequivocally worse off with perfect information, since 
the price they pay increases from P* to Q H .  Moreover, the positive 
profits being earned by informed flrms are  not eroded by entry, since new 
flrms are  by deflruLion uninformed ones. 
Nature of EQuilibrium 
We now turn to the case where firms learn over time about the 
characteristics of their customers through loss data. Initially each firm 
only knows from statistical records that the proportion of high and low 
risk individuals in the insured population is given by NH and NL respec- 
tively where NH + NL = 1. It does not know whether an individual is in 
the H or L class but does know how many periods each potential custo- 
mer has been in the market  (e.g., all 20 year old males a re  assumed to 
have been driving legally since age 16). Any new customer i.s offered a 
premium, P*,  w h c h  is defined as before so that 
We will assume that both Qt and QH are greater  than zero and that the 
insurer does not know how much insurance each person purchases. 
During each time period an individual can suffer at most one loss, 
which if it occurs will cause X dollars damage. Any time a claims pay- 
ment is made this information is recorded on the insurer's record and a 
new premium, which reflects h s  overall loss experience, is set  for the 
next period. As before, we are assuming that informed firms do not dis- 
close their records to other firms. Individuals who are dissatisfied with 
their new premium can seek insurance elsewhere. Other firms will not 
have access to the insured's record and hence cannot verify whether an 
applicant has had few or many losses under previous insurance contracts. 
The informed firm uses a Bayesian updating process in readjusting 
its premium structure on the basis of its loss experience. Consider all 
customers who have been with the same insurance company for exactly t 
periods. They can have anywhere from 0 to t losses during t h s  interval. 
The premium charged for period t + 1 to individuals with j losses during 
a t period interval is ~ ; , j  = 0 . . , t .I2 Firms with loss experience data 
will set each premium P; so that they maximize profits, subject to the 
constraint that customers remain with them. Let w h  and w: be the pro- 
babilities that an individual is in the low and high risk class when the firm 
initially insures h m .  We can update the probabilities by using Bayes pro- 
cedure. If a customer has suffered exactly j losses in a t period interval 
then we define wh, i = L . H  as the probability that he is in the ith risk 
class,13 where w$ + wh = 1. The premium set for each loss classifica- 
tion will also be determined in part by the relative values of wjt .i = L . H .  
As j increases so does the probability that the individual is in the high 
H H risk class. Hence, wjt > wj- l , t ,  j = 1 , . . , , t .  
"%e are assuming tha t  losses for an individual are independent of previous experience so 
t e premium a t  the .end of t is determined only by the number of claims. 
' h e  determine % as follows. Let Yt = probability that an individual experiences j 
losses in t periods, if he is in risk class Z .  Specifically, 
Using Bayes formula 
Suppose, for example, an informed firm offers a set of premiums 
!Pit{ with P; increasing as j increases.14 An uninformed firm whch 
charged a lower premium than Pit would attract all customers with j or 
more losses.15 The proportion of h g h  and low customers in their port- 
folio is given by 
where sk = probability of a person suffering exactly k losses in a t period 
interval. In other words, Wjt is a weighted average over the loss range 
j . . t .  Since w$ increases with j we know that W; > w$ for all 
j = 1  . . .  f - l a n d  ~f l :=wE.  
The minimum premium (P') at wluch expected profit equals zero for 
uninformed firms is given by: 
where is demand for group i given a premium P ;  We know that P]:; 
increases with j since W$ increases with j .  Hence any new firm wluch 
sets P = PI; attracts only customers with j or more losses and makes 
zero expected profits. So (8) correctly describes the minimum level of 
premiums that uninformed firms can charge. 
If the informed firm sets Pjt = P; -E  for only those customers who 
have suffered exactly j losses, then these individuals will still prefer the 
~nformed firm. Its expected profits are given by 
For sufficiently small E ,  expected profits in (9) are positive for 
'%e will show below that P; incremes as j increases. 
l%e are assuming no transaction costs for insured individuals to switch firms. 
j = 1 t - 1 since w$ 1s less than W $  For j = t .  as E 0. profits by 
defimtion will also approach zero since UJ; = W t t .  
To determine the premium structure, an informed firm will also have 
to find the monopoly premiums IFjt j for each j = 0  . . . t ,  which maxim- 
ize ,!?(TIjt). It will maximize expected profits for each loss category if it 
then sets premiums (P;) as follows 
A 
Pi = min IPS - E , P ~ ~ ~ .  j - 0 . .  t 
The structure of the premiums is thus identical to the case of perfect 
information outlined above except that profits will be lower because firms 
must now use claims information to categorize their customers and 
hence will rnisclassify some of them. Aggregate expected profits for each 
period t are given by 
An Illustrative Example 
A two period example using the same parameters as in the previous 
problem illustrates the differences between learning from loss experience 
and having perfect information on insured individuals. Initially the  firm 
sets the same premium as  before--i.e., P' = .254 from (7). Table 1 illus- 
trates how one calculates the welghts for determining the optimal prem- 
ium structure a t  the end of period 1 when j  = 0  o r  1, and Figure 4 
details the optimal rate structure a t  the end of period 1. The optimal 
premiums are  Pil = ,254 and P;, = .288 since pol = pll = .495. Th.e 
premium charged to  the group suffering one loss (P;~ ) , yields E (TIll) = 0 
since = P;, , and ulK = wr1. Expected profits for the "zero loss" 
class is given by (9) and is 
E (no,) = ,5625 (.254-. 10) 12 + .4375 (.254-.30) 40 = -23. 
Aggregate expected profi ts  for period 1 a r e  given by (10) and in this case 
are E (Ill) = .8(.23) = .18. 
Table 1:  Calculation of Weights ujl and wj1 i = L H for Two Period Yodel. 
7.69 12 
Figure 4. A Two Period Example Based on Loss Experience. 
It is worthwhile to focus on the welfare effects of experience rating 
when t = 1. In the case of two groups, those with the hlghest risk will 
either pay an actuarially fair rate or be subsidized by the low risk group. 
The misclassification of individuals thus always benefits those in the H 
class: either they are misclassified by being placed in the lower premiurn 
category (because they don't suffer a loss in period 1) or they suffer a 
loss but have a premium lower than i P H  because some low risk individuals 
also have the bad luck to incur a loss in period 1. It also follows that the 
low risk individuals are charged premiums above i P L ,  because of the 
firm's ability to exploit inside information. In the above example we see 
that the premiurn for low risk individuals would have been P; = .217 if the 
firm had perfect information on each individual; it was actually 
P ; ~  = ,288 or = .254 depending on whether or not the individual 
experienced a loss in period 1. If the firm had wanted to break even on 
each rate class, it would have charged the same premium for customers 
with one loss but a premium of .23? for those with zero losses. 
As a customer's life with the company increases then he faces a 
larger number of rate classes reflecting the possible outcomes. Firms 
makes the largest profit on those customers who experience the fewest 
losses. In the limit as t -, =, all customers will be accurately classified 
and we have the case of perfect information. Figure 5 graphcally depicts 
how aggregate expected profit changes over time as a function of propor- 
tion of low risk customers in the population. As NL decreases then the 
informed firm's profit potential decreases since a larger proportion of 
individuals will suffer losses. 
Obtaining Verified Information 
The problem in achieving optimality arises, of course, because 
informed firms--the ones from which the consumer is currently 
purchasing--obtain positive profits in the long run. A natural response of 
low risk consumers facing such a situation is to seek some way of provid- 
ing reliable information on their status to other insurance firms. There 
are two ways in which such data mlght be disseminated: (1.) Consumers 
Aggregate Expected 
Profit ( E (TIt) 1 
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Figure 5. Aggregate Expected Profits [ E  (n,)] as a Function of Proportion of 
Low Risk Customers ( N ~ )  and Time ( t ) .  
might provide verified information on their actual number of losses 
(claims), and/or (2) Consumers might provide verified information on 
the size of their premium bill for a given level of insurance, since t h s  is a 
perfect indicator of the risk class into which they are being placed by 
their current insurer. 
W e  would expect that consumers will find it difficult and costly to 
undertake either of these actions. For one thing, the current insurer has 
an incentive to conceal its claims and premium data. For another thing, 
purchasers of insurance who have had unfavorable loss experiences may 
try to represent themselves as being a better risk by using techniques 
such as bogus invoices, or applying for insurance right after an accident 
but before a new bill is issued. Note that the informed firm will not 
discourage such behavior, because it makes it more difficult for custo- 
mers with good experience to communicate their status reliably. 
The cost of communicating reliable information, will still permit the 
original insurer to earn some positive profits and the single period model 
is still relevant as a polar case. One could incorporate the costs of com- 
municating of verified information into a more general model of the 
choice processes of insurers and insured. Profits would then be limited 
by the alternatives available to  consumers re  the purchasing verified 
information. 
Extensions of the Model 
The model of firm behavior was based on a number of simplifying 
short-term equilibrium assumptions which can now be relaxed without 
changing the basic qualitative results regarding equilibrium: viz, entry 
will be restricted in an industry where firms have inside information and 
monopoly profits will result if there is no regulation. 
Increasing the N u m b e r  of Aisk Classes 
As the number of risk classes increases the  computations become 
more complicated but the nature of the solution remains the same as in 
the above case. The hghest  risk class will either pay the actuarial ra te  or 
be subsidized by the lower risk classes. Firms will make profits by 
exploiting their inside knowledge that some individuals are  good risks. 
Firms without these data cannot determine whether an applicant has had 
few or many losses; hence, they have t o  assume he is an average indivi- 
dual. 
Imperfec t  In format ion  b y  Consumers  
If consumers do not have accurate estimates of the risks they are 
facing, then firms can exploit this imperfection if they have statistical 
data on whch to  base their estimates. Even if they cannot identify the 
risk category of each individual they can charge a set of premiums whch 
maximizes their expected profits and still maintains their customers. We 
thus have a mixture of a purely competitive market and monopoly in 
determining the final rates. As Meindorfer and Kunreuther (1981) and 
others, have shown, a stable competitive market will lead to a premium 
based on the true risk even if consumers misperceive it. Otherwise a firm 
can enter and make positive profits by charging a premium slightly above 
the actuarial rate. In our model, imperfect information will have no 
impact on the rate setting process for any values of P; = P;. Whenever 
the firms finds that P; = pjt < it will then take advantage of inaccu- 
racies by the consumer by setting a rate based on consumer mispercep- 
tions of the risk. 
W. MULTI-PERIOD MODELS 
We now investigate the consequences of changing the assumption 
that there is no foresight. We first consider a model in whch firms look 
beyond current period losses to potential future profits. Firms are there- 
fore assumed to be concerned with the present &scounted value of the 
profit stream they expect to earn. But purchasers are still assumed to be 
myopic, in the sense that they choose which insurer to  patronize by look- 
ing only at current period premiums. A second model permits both con- 
sumers and firms to have foresight. Consumers choose (in the initial 
period) that firm which offers them the hghest lifetime utility. Consu- 
mers are free to leave firms if they wish, but firms are required to abide 
by the agreed-upon schedule of premiums as a function of the consumer's 
loss experience. 
A Myopic M ulti-Period M ode1 
Suppose that the firm is willing to tolerate losses for a whle in order 
to attract customers and observe their loss experiences. It can then use 
this information to make profits in the future to offset (in present value 
terms) the initial losses. Consumers are still assumed to behave in a 
myopic fashon, in the sense that they choose in each period whchever 
insurer quotes the lowest premium for that period. 
It is easy to see that the "single-period" premium schedule lPjt j may 
not be an equilibrium. On the one hand, a firm that charged less than pa: 
in the initial period would have an  expected loss in that period, on the 
other hand, it would have the opportunity to observe which individuals did 
and did not have losses during that period. If it used that information to 
change the schedule P; in subsequent periods, the present discounted 
value of the profit stream associated with t h s  pricing policy could be suf- 
ficient to offset the initial expected losses. Hence, a new schedule, with 
the lower Pa,, would dominate the single-period equilibrium schedule. 
What new set of premiums would represent an  equilibrium schedule? 
An equilibrium schedule would be one where, for all t and j ,  there would 
be no opportunity for a previously uninformed firm to enter and earn 
positive expected profits. To simplify the explanation of how this 
schedule is derived, we assume an interest rate of zero, so as not to be 
concerned with discounting. We assume that the firm whch has attracted 
a customer in period 0, will want to set its premiums for all future periods 
up to the end of the planning horizon T so that no firm entering the 
market in later periods can attract  any set of its customers and make a 
stream of profits whose sum is positive. That is, it will want to set P$ so 
that 
for all j .  Here P** is also the price that the new entrant would charge 
The procedure in constructing a set  of premiums P** requires one to  
s t a r t  at  period T and work backwards. Any uninformed firm who enters 
the market  at  the beginning of period T must break even, because there 
is by definition no future period in whch  losses can be recouped. Hence, 
P; = P ; ~  for all j .  Now consider period T - 1. If a firm entered in this 
period it could observe the  experience of its customers for one period 
and make profits on on all those individuals who did not have a loss during 
this period. 
The expected profits in period T are derived using the same type of 
Bayesian updating procedure described in section 111. In order to  prevent 
new entrants from coming into the market in period T - 1 ,  the informed 
firm must  set  its premium in period T  - 1  sufficiently low so tha t  a poten- 
tial new entrant  would suffer a loss just a little larger than the profit he 
would earn  in period T .  As in the single period equilibrium model, there 
will be a different premium for each value of j. T h s  set  of policies f ~ r ~ - ~  j would then be the equilibrium schedule for the fully informed 
firm. 
The same type of reasoning is utilized to compute the equilibrium set 
of premiums for period T - 2 .  In this case a potential entrant  who a t t rac ts  
customers can make profits in periods T - 1  and T by utilizing claims 
information on their insured population. The informed firm will then have 
to  s e t  !P;;-~] a t  levels wh ch  erase all these potential profits of a new 
firm. The same process is repeated sequentially for all periods through 
t = 0. 
To illustrate differences between resulting premiums in the single 
period and myopic multi-period equilibrium cases we consider the same 
example a s  in Section Ill with T  = 5. Table 2  compares the set  of premi- 
ums and expected profits for the  two models. In the  single period equili- 
brium the informed firm's premium (poi) s tar ts  off equal to the average 
actuarial value (P* = ,254) and increases above this level for custom.ers 
who experience losses. In the  myopic case, the initial premium, pay, is 
less than  P* ,  and increases over time whether or not the person suffers a 
loss.16 As t approaches T ,  the premiums for the  two types of equilibria 
I61t is theoretically possible for consumers initially t o  be charged a negative premium to  at- 
tract them to the hsurance company so that they could be charged higher premiums as i!
increases. In this case, individuals could be given a free gift for taking out insurance, in an 
Table  2. Comparison Between Premiums and Expected P r o f i t s  f o r  S i n g l e  
P e r i o d  E q u i l i b r i u m  and Myopic Mul t i  P e r i o d  E q u i i i b r i u m  Schedule  
f o r  F ive  P e r i o d  Problem. 
Single Period Equilibrium 
Myopic Multi Period Equilibrium 
I I I 
converge as expected. In the single-period case, the stream of profits is 
positive, in all periods; in the multi-period myopic case the firm suffers 
losses in the early periods recouping them in later periods so that the 
expected stream of profits is zero. 
Table 2 reveals that  there is a perversity and allocative inefficiency 
in the multi-period myopic case. Consumers are undercharged in the 
early periods but will find that their premiums are raised even if they are  
accident free. Persons nearing the end of their risk horizons (e .g . ,  the 
aged who will only be driving for a few more years) will tend to be over- 
charged for insurance, whereas the young will tend to be under- 
charged'? Hence. consumers will tend to over-purchase insurance in the 
early periods, and under-purchase insurance in the later periods. If regu- 
lation could be used to bring premiums closer to the actuarial values, 
there would be a welfare gain. 
Full Multi-Period Equilibrium 
We now consider whether consumers who wish to  maximize their util- 
ity over the planning horizon would prefer a firm which offers a schedule 
other than fp*]  or  tp**j. We have already shown that the  schedule [P*] 
would be dominated by lP**j. Suppose a firm could offer a condit ional  
premium schedule (~51. one which specified premiums in any future 
period as a function of the number of losses up to that  point. 
The schedule IP${ will still ordinarily dominate Iqy] because, as we 
have seen, IP;] sets  premiums whose deviation, from actuarial value 
varies with t .  Consumers would prefer a schedule whi.ch did not; induce 
them to overpurchase in early periods, or underpurchase in later periods. 
a alogous fashon to  the approach used by savings banks to attract new accounts. 
'This is exactly the opposite direction of discrimination born that recently alleged in auto- 
mobile insurance ra-te hearings in Massachusetts and New Jersey. 
A set  of premiums is a full multi-period (or conditional) equilibrium 
schedule if it is preferred in period 0 by every low risk individual to any 
other policy that would generate zero or positive expected profits. Since 
all such premiums in fPTtj are less than GH, a policy which attracts low 
risks will also usually be preferred by h g h  risks. The only other option 
for h g h  risks is a policy with premiums GH for each period, which will be 
chosen only if h g h  risks are very averse to fluctuations in premiums or 
high and low risks have nearly identical risks. We assume here that h g h  
risks also purchase the equilibrium policy. 18 
Firms will therefore want to set a schedule of premiums fPjt j that 
maximizes the expected utility of low risk individuals E ( U L ) ,  where the 
only basis for discriminating between risk classes is through loss experi- 
ence. For any period t + l  the expected utility for a low risk person of a 
premium schedule fPjt j j = 0 . . . t is given by 
where ALt = wealth level for low risk person a t  the end of period t and 
hjt = probability of j losses in a t period interval (see Footnote 13). By 
making the simplifying assumption that consumers and firms have the 
same discount factor, a, then the optimal schedule for a low risk person 
is one which maximizes 
subject to E(&) = 0 for all t .  We have imposed a breakeven requirement 
in each period, because there is no utility gain to  firms or consumers of 
'%f high risk customem are not interested in this policy then some firms wi l l  offer two 
premium schedules, one to attract low risk consumers and the other for high risk customers. 
This situation is uninteresting for our analysis, since experience rating is not needed to 
discriminate between risk groups. 
sh~fting premiums from period to period,19 Note, however. that under 
thls policy the insurer will not expect to break even on every risk class. 
People with many losses will be subsidized ex post by those with few 
losses. Yet a regulatory policy that required premiums to  be propor- 
tional to  actuarially fair ones for all risk classes would not, in fact, be as 
desirable to consumers. 
The expression for E ( u ~ )  is the present discounted value of the 
stream of expected utilities. Given risk aversion, it is easy to  see that  
maximization of E  ( UL) will require Ptt to  be less than h h .  while Pot will be 
greater than h i ,  etc.  That is, in order to reduce the  risk associated with 
fluctuations in premiums as  a function of losses, income is transferred 
from experience classes (states) in which few losses have occurred to  
experience classes (states) in which many losses have occurred. 
In this model there are  no informed or uninformed firms because all 
transactions take place In the same period. Hence, there will always be  
an equilibrium schedule since the  game theoretic considerations of the 
single period model do not apply here.  Given the assumptions of this 
model, we conjecture that  the equilibrium schedule is also a Pareto 
optimum. For it is clear tha t  if there was some way of making low and 
high risk persons all be t ter  off than under the equilibrium schedule, that  
schedule would then become an equilibrium. Of course, if firms could 
observe total purchases of insurance, there would be some conditional 
price-quantity policy that  would be Pareto superior to  the conditional 
price policy. 
mOf course, if firms had a lower a then consumers (say, because of better access to  capital 
markets), then consumers would prefer t o  shift prerr~iums to later periods, in effect taking a 
loan (at better-than-usual interest rates) from the insurer. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has described three alternative concepts of equilibrium in 
insurance markets with experience rating. The single period policy 
enables firms to earn monopoly profits in the long-run. As a result, low 
risk customers are only marginally better off with experience rating than 
without it; high risk customers are worse off. With respect to the multi- 
period equilibrium, expected profits of firms are zero and low risk indivi- 
duals obtain a substantial increase in utility. The increase is smaller 
under the myopic multi-period policy than under the multi-period policy. 
In the latter case the insured population prefers premiums that have 
more of a leveling effect than would be implied by setting rates based 
solely on the number of losses. 
Behavioral and Regulatory Implications 
Which of these radically different insurance contracts are a better 
description of reality? The empirical evidence on consumer decision 
processes regarding insurance purchase behavior suggests that for some 
types of insurance many individuals have limited knowledge of premiums 
or available coverage (Kunreuther et  al. 1978). Hence we hypothesize 
that one would often expect that few consumers attempt to obtain infor- 
mation on how their premiums will be adjusted with experience. They 
undoubtedly have a vague notion that such adjustments occur, but have 
no written information on their insurance policy as to what these changes 
are. Furthermore, an insurer cannot distinguish between new purchasers 
and bad risks seeking a better deal. Hence, the single period equilibrium 
model often appears to better describe real world behavior because both 
the consumer and firm have imperfect information. 
If the single period equilibrium is the most likely one, then there are 
potential welfare gains from regulation to control monopoly profits and 
set more equitable rates. This can take the form of a ceiling on specific 
rates or a requirement that firms provide their customers with certified 
records of their previous accident records so all insurers have access to 
this information when deciding premiums for their new customers. Ideal 
rate regulation should require premiums to be set close to the actuarial 
experience for each class of risks rather than mandating uniform (non- 
experienced) or community rating. This can be acheved either by having 
insurance commissioners require data on actuarial experience or simply 
by having them regulate the rate of return. With respect to certification 
of customer records, it is interesting to note that if firms were forced to 
disclose personal information on their customers, all insured individuals 
would be better off since monopoly profits will have been eroded away. 20 
If ,  however, the true state of affairs is characterized by the multi- 
period equilibrium conditions, then it would not be desirable to  require 
premiums to be actuarially fair since t h s  rate structure would be viewed 
as undesirable by consumers. On the contrary, optimality in that  model 
requires premiums that are more "level" than actuarially fair ones, if peo- 
ple are risk averse. In short, ideal regulation requires determining the 
nature of equilibrium. 
Other Applications and Extensions 
The rationale for the coexistence of recurrent spot markets and 
internal labor markets directly follows from the above analysis. In 
recurrent spot markets we would expect all firms to have similar 
knowledge about the potential productivity of their employees. On the 
other hand, internal labor markets are appropriate for describing sltua- 
tions where the firm learns about different skills from experience. Low 
skilled workers are  equivalent to the high risk group and do not change 
jobs because they are paid wages in excess of their marginal productivity. 
Highly skilled workers are equivalent to the low risk group because other 
firms cannot measure their special talents. They are thus paid a wage 
less than their marginal productivity but more than they could obtain 
201nsurance firms attempt to obtain entry-level information on drivers by asking them on 
application forms whether they have ever been cancelled or refused coverage by another 
company. It is not clear, however, whether companies can check the accuracy of these 
responses. 
elsewhere. 
We would expect that a long-run tenure contract or multi-period pol- 
icy would be more appropriate in characterizing the labor market scene 
than insurance markets. Hlgh skilled workers have an incentive to bar- 
gain with firms to pre-specify wage payments as a function of productivity 
over time in order to reduce monopoly profits which emerge from period 
by period adjustments. The question of whether the resulting wage struc- 
ture is a multi-period equilibrium is clouded by questions of monopoly 
powers of unions and monopsony power of certain firms. 
The concept of experience rating over time suggests reasons for job 
classification schemes in much the same way that insurance systems 
have rate classification schemes. In this sense the models developed in 
this paper complement the important work of Spence (1973) on market 
signaling which provides a way of classifying individuals on the basis of 
observable traits such as educational status. There still may be difficul- 
ties in distinguishing between "good" and "bad" risks but these informa- 
tion imperfections will be reduced to the extent that a particular variable 
is an accurate discriminator. 
Another relevant question relates to the implications for market 
behavior if firms use, or are forced to use, updating rules which differ 
from the Bayesian ones described above. For example, suppose firms 
have only 3 or 4 rate classifications no matter what happens to an indivi- 
dual and no matter how many periods he has been insured with a firm. In 
several European countries an individual who has had no losses for a cer- 
tain number of consecutive years is automatically placed in the lowest 
rate classification. Most US companies do not consider a policyholder's 
record indefinitely but only process data for a limited number of periods 
such as five years. How would such procedures affect the equilibria for 
the h g h  and low risk groups? 
A final, and in mf ~y ways fundamental matter, is the development of 
a model of insurance premium setting. An individual or group's past 
experience is not the only information available to the insurance firm; 
premiums in practice depend both on experience and on certain indivi- 
dual characteristics, such as age, sex, marital status, etc. How should all 
of this information be used in determining a particular individual's prem- 
ium, either from the viewpoint of Pareto optimality or from the viewpoint 
of competitive survival? How might imperfectly informed consumers 
interact with imperfectly informed firms? These questions are beyond 
the scope of this paper but suggest fruitful areas for increasing our 
understanding of insurance markets. 
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